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Abstract
We present reputation-based mechanisms for building reliable task computing systems over the Internet. The most
characteristic examples of such systems are the volunteer computing (e.g., SETI@home using the BOINC platform)
and the crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). In both examples end users are offering over the
Internet their computing power or their human intelligence to solve tasks either voluntarily or under payment. While
the main advantage of these systems is the inexpensive computational power provided; the main drawback is the
untrustworthy nature of the end users. Generally, this type of systems are modelled under the “master-worker” setting.
A “master” has a set of tasks to compute and instead of computing them locally she sends these tasks to available
“workers” that compute and report back the task results. We categorize these workers in three generic types: altruistic,
malicious and rational. Altruistic workers that always return the correct result, malicious workers that always return
an incorrect result, and rational workers that decide to reply or not truthfully depending on what increases their benefit.
We design a reinforcement learning mechanism to induce a correct behavior to rational workers, while the mechanism
is complemented by four reputation schemes that cope with malice. The goal of the mechanism is to reach a state of
eventual correctness, that is, a stable state of the system in which the master always obtains the correct task results.
Analysis of the system gives provable guarantees under which truthful behavior can be ensured by modelling the
system as a Markov chain. Finally, we observe the behavior of the mechanism through simulations that use realistic
system parameters values. Simulations not only agree with the analysis but also reveal interesting trade-offs between
various metrics and parameters. The correlation among cost and convergence time to a truthful behavior is shown and
the four reputation schemes are assessed against the tolerance to cheaters.
1 Introduction
The Internet is turning into a massive source of inexpensive computational power. Every entity connected over the
Internet is a potential source not only of machine computational power but also of human intelligence. For this reason
numerous platforms [5, 6, 12, 23] have been designed to harvest this computational power. What makes this type
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of computational power so appealing besides the fact that is inexpensive is the easy access that one can have to it.
Unfortunately, for the same reason computations carried out over the Internet can not be trusted. Not only end users
can hide behind their anonymity but also who ever is requesting the computation may be lacking tools to verify the
validity of the results.
Usually we refer to this source of computational power as Internet-based task computing; since we are dealing
with computations carried out over the Internet in the form of small assignments for the end users. We will refer
to these small assignments as tasks. As we mentioned before, this type of computation is inexpensive compared to
supercomputing. The reason is because the end users are not devoted to the computation and they usually accept
to perform these small tasks for a low payment or even volunteer for them. The most representative examples of
Internet-based task computing are volunteer computing and crowdsourcing.
Volunteer computing has been greatly embraced by the scientific community that is always in need of cheap super-
computing power. End users engaged by the mission of the project are willing to contribute their machine’s idle com-
putational time. The majority of these volunteering projects are using the BOINC platform [6], with SETI@home [33]
being one of the most characteristic examples. IBM’s initiative through the World Community Grid [1] is able to bring
together organizations dealing with health, poverty and sustainability with volunteers all over the Internet that want to
put in a good use their idle processing power. Besides joining a project to support a scientific goal, a worker might
also be attracted by the prestige of having her contribution announced [7]. This last reason for joining the computation
together with the fact that a user might actually want to harm the project are enough to jeopardize the reliability of
volunteer computing. Several studies [6, 7, 10, 25, 31] have found evidence that reliability of data is not an a-priory
property of volunteer computing and there is a need for establishing it.
Besides users volunteering computational resources, humans themselves connected to the Internet are a source of
computational power. The word crowdsourcing was introduced by Howe [26] to describe the situation where human
intelligence tasks are executed over the Internet by humans that are given monetary, social or other kind of incentives.
A profit-seeking computation platform has been developed by Amazon, called Mechanical Turk [5] (MTurk). Users
sign in to the platform and choose to performhuman intelligence tasks (HIT). In return they get a monetary reward. The
most common tasks encountered in MTurk are closed class questions (following the categorization in [18]), meaning
that the range of answers is a limited predefined set. Like volunteer computing, crowdsourcing system can not be
consider reliable [18, 27], especially now that participants expect a monetary gain.
Another example of an application that can be considered Internet-based computing is Bitcoin mining [12], that
has produced a huge interest from the users and the financial industry. In Bitcoin mining workers carry out complex
computations to validate transactions based on Bitcoins, a virtual currency. The computational paradigm is peer-to-
peer, that is, there is no centralized authority. Nevertheless, the whole system can be viewed as the master assigning
tasks to workers, or in this case, the miners. Given that miners may be deceitful, the system must include measures
to prevent or minimize this drawback. However, Bitcoin relies on the complexity of the computation and Bitcoin
payments (proof of work) to guarantee trustworthiness [11].
Finally, another example of Internet-based task computing we could consider is virtual citizen science [17, 30].
We could say that this type of computation is a hybrid among what we call volunteer computing and crowdsourcing.
Volunteers over the Internet willing to help scientists accept to participate in task that need human intelligence to be
solved. One of the most characteristic project is Galaxy Zoo [17, 23], engaging volunteers to classify galaxies into
categories, doing so in many occasions in the form of a “fun” game. It was through the work of Von Ahn [48], that
pioneered games with a purpose, where we first saw this type of scheme for creating a more pleasant experience for
the volunteers. As pointed out by Kloetzer et al. [30] volunteers will gradually learn to perform a task through these
“task-game mechanisms” as they call them. Thus, these type of volunteers actually become reliable over time and
given the right incentives.
All of the aforementioned examples in essence follow a master-worker model. A master process sends tasks across
the Internet, to available worker processes, that execute and report back the task results. Moreover, it is clear from
the nature of Internet-based task computing that workers can not be trusted, for the reasons mentioned before. Thus,
in order to be able to establish reliability in this type of computation we need first to be able to correctly model
the workers’ behavior. A number of attempts have been made in the past to classify these workers. In Distributed
Computing a classical approach is to model the malfunctioning (due to a hardware or a software error) or cheating
(intentional wrongdoer) asmaliciousByzantine workers that wish to hamper the computation and thus always return an
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incorrect result. The non-faulty workers are viewed as altruistic ones [40] that always return the correct result. On the
other hand, a game-theoretic approach assumes that workers are rational [2, 24, 41], that is, a worker decides whether
to truthfully compute and return the correct result or return a bogus result, based on the strategy that best serves its
self-interest (increases its benefit). Following the literature and also the motivating examples we will categorize our
workers into three types: malicious, altruistic and rational. Moreover we assume that the master will be interacting
with the same workers for a long period of time. In the case of volunteer computing this is a natural assumption since
participants usually remain in the system for a long period of time [38]. On the other hand in a crowdsourcing setting
it is desirable to form a group of workers that will become “experts” on the type of tasks requested by the master.
Under these assumptions our goal is take advantage of the repeated interaction of the master with the workers to
guarantee that at some future step of the master’s interaction with the workers, the master will always be receiving the
correct task result with the minimum cost.
1.1 Background
As part of our mechanism we use reinforcement learning to induce the correct behavior of rational workers. Reinforce-
ment learning [45] models how system entities, or learners, interact with the environment to decide upon a strategy,
and use their experience to select or avoid actions according to the consequences observed. Positive payoffs increase
the probability of the strategy just chosen, and negative payoffs reduce this probability. Payoffs are seen as parameter-
izations of players’ responses to their experiences. There are several models of reinforcement learning. A well-known
model is that of Bush and Mosteller [13]; this is an aspiration-based reinforcement learning model where negative
effects on the probability distribution over strategies are possible, and learning does not fade with time. The learners
adapt by comparing their experience with an aspiration level. In our work we adapt this reinforcement learning model
and we consider a simple aspiration scheme where aspiration is fixed by the workers and does not change during the
evolutionary process.
The master reinforces its strategy as a function of the reputation calculated for each worker. Reputation has been
widely considered in on-line communities that deal with untrustworthy entities, such as online auctions (e.g., eBay) or
P2P file sharing sites (e.g., BitTorrent); it provides a mean of evaluating the degree of trust of an entity [28]. Reputation
measures can be characterized in many ways, for example, as objective or subjective, centralized or decentralized. An
objective measure comes from an objective assessment process while a subjective measure comes from the subjective
belief that each evaluating entity has. In a centralized reputation scheme a central authority evaluates the entities by
calculating the ratings received from each participating entity. In a decentralized system entities share their experience
with other entities in a distributed manner. In our work, we use the master as a central authority that objectively
calculates the reputation of each worker, based on its interaction with it; this centralized approach is also used by
BOINC.
The BOINC system itself uses a form of reputation [9] for an optional policy called adaptive replication. This
policy avoids replication in the event that a job has been sent to a highly reliable worker. The philosophy of this
reputation scheme is to be intolerant to cheaters by instantly minimizing their reputation. Our mechanism differs
significantly from the one that is used in BOINC. One important difference is that we use auditing to check the validity
of the worker’s answers while BOINC uses only replication; in this respect, we have a more generic mechanism that
also guarantees reliability of the system. Notwithstanding inspired by the way BOINC handles reputation we have
designed a BOINC-like reputation type in our mechanism (called Boinc). The adaptive replication policy currently
used by BOINC has changed relatively recently. BOINC used to have a different policy [8], where a long time was
required for the worker to gain a good reputation but a short time to lose it. In this work we evaluate the two policies
used by BOINC, adapted of course to our mechanism. We call the old policy Legacy Boinc and we seek to understand
the quantitative and qualitative improvements among the two schemes.
Sonnek et al. [44] use an adaptive reputation-based technique for task scheduling in volunteer setting (i.e., projects
running BOINC). Reputation is used as a mechanism to reduce the degree of redundancy while keeping it possible for
the master to verify the results by allocating more reliable nodes. In our work we do not focus on scheduling tasks
to more reliable workers to increase reliability but rather we design a mechanism that forces the system to evolve to
a reliable state. We also demonstrate several tradeoff between reaching a reliable state fast and the master’s cost. We
have created a reputation function (called reputation Linear) that is analogous to the reputation function used in [44]
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to evaluate this function’s performance in our setting.
1.2 Our contributions
We aim at establishing a reliable computation system in task computing settings such as volunteer computing and
crowdsourcing. This computation system is modelled as a master-worker interaction, where the master assigns tasks
to a fixed set of workers in an online fashion. (Prediction mechanisms such as the one in [34] can be used to establish
the availability of a set of workers for a relatively long period of time.) Workers on the other hand are active, aware of
their repeated interaction with the master and willing to reply. They are categorized into three types: (1) altruistic, (2)
malicious and (3) rationals. The good behavior of the rational workers is reinforced through an incentives mechanism
and while the malicious workers are being identified through a number of reputation schemes proposed. The goal of
the system is to achieve a stable state where the master will always receive the correct task reply with the minimum
cost to the master (i.e. auditing), from there forth. In detail, our contributions are as follows.
• We design such an algorithmic mechanism that uses reinforcement learning (through reward and optional punish-
ment) to induce a correct behavior to rational workers while coping with malice using reputation.
• We consider a centralized reputation scheme controlled by the master that may use four different reputation metrics
to calculate each worker’s reputation. The first (reputation type Linear) is adopted from [44] and it is a simple
approach for calculating reputation. The second reputation type (called Exponential) , which we introduce, allows
for a more drastic change of reputation simply because the mathematical function used changes faster. The third
reputation type is inspired by BOINC’s current reputation scheme [9], thus we call it Boinc. Finally, the fourth
reputation scheme [9] is inspired by the previously used reputation scheme [8] of BOINC (called Legacy Boinc)
and it uses an indirect way of calculating reputation through an error rate.
• We analyze our reputation-basedmechanismmodeling it as a Markov chain and we identify conditions under which
truthful behavior can be ensured. We analytically prove that by using the reputation type Exponential (i.e. the one
we introduce) reliable computation is eventually achieved.
• Simulation results, obtained using parameter values extracted by BOINC-operated applications (such as [4, 19]
), reveal interesting trade-offs between various metrics and parameters, such as cost, time of convergence to a
truthful behavior, tolerance to cheaters and the type of reputation metric employed. Simulations also reveal better
performance of our reputation type (Exponential) in several realistic cases.
1.3 Related work
In Distributed Computing intentional or unintentional misbehaviours (a hardware or software error) from the workers
are modelled assuming Byzantine (malicious) workers that want to harm the computation and thus reply with an
incorrect result. Workers that are not misbehaving, that is they reply with a correct result are seen as altruistic workers.
Under this view, malicious-tolerant protocols have been considered, e.g., [20,32,39], where the master decides on the
correct result based on majority voting. On the other hand, game-theoretic approaches have been devised modelling
the workers as rational [2, 24, 41], that will compute and reply with the correct result only if this strategy maximizes
their benefit (utility), otherwise they will choose a strategy where they are dishonest, replying with an incorrect result.
Under this view, incentive-based algorithmic mechanisms have been devised, e.g., [21,50], that employ reward/punish
schemes to “enforce” rational workers to act correctly.
In [15], all three types were considered, and both approaches were combined in order to produce an algorithmic
mechanism that provides incentives to rational workers to act correctly, while alleviating the malicious workers’ ac-
tions. All the solutions described are one-shot (or stateless) in the sense that the master decides about the outcome of
an interaction with the workers involving a specific task, without using any knowledge gained by prior interactions.
In [16], we took advantage of the repeated interactions between the master and the workers, assuming the presence of
only rational workers. For this purpose, we studied the dynamics of evolution [43] of such master-worker computa-
tions through reinforcement learning [45] where both the master and the workers adjust their strategies based on their
prior interaction. The objective of the master is to reach a state in the computation after which it always obtains the
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correct results, while the workers attempt to increase their benefit. Hence, prior work either considered all three types
of workers in one-shot computations, or multi-round interactions assuming only rational workers.
Aiyer et al. [3] introduce the BAR model to reason about systems with Byzantine (malicious), Altruistic, and
Rational participants. They also introduce the notion of a protocol being BAR-tolerant, that is, the protocol is resilient
to both Byzantine faults and rational manipulation. As an application, they designed a cooperative backup service for
P2P systems, based on a BAR-tolerant replicated state machine. Li et al [36] also considered the BAR model to design
a P2P live streaming application based on a BAR-tolerant gossip protocol. Both works employ incentive-based game
theoretic techniques (to remove the selfish behavior), but the emphasis is on building a reasonably practical system
(hence, formal analysis is traded for practicality). Recently, Li et al [35] developed a P2P streaming application, called
FlightPath, that provides a highly reliable data stream to a dynamic set of peers. FlightPath, as opposed to the above-
mentioned BAR-based works, is based on mechanisms for approximate equilibria [14], rather than strict equilibria.
In particular, ǫ-Nash equilibria are considered, in which rational players deviate if and only if they expect to benefit
by more than a factor of ǫ. As the authors claim, the less restrictive nature of these equilibria enables the design of
incentives to limit selfish behavior rigorously, while it provides sufficient flexibility to build practical systems. More
recent works have considered other problems in the BAR model (e.g., data transfer [47]). Although the objectives
and the model considered are different, our reputation-based mechanism can be considered, in some sense, to be
BAR-tolerant.
Various surveys focus on the obstacles and challenges that current crowdsourcing approaches face [29, 42, 49].
One of the most crucial issues that crowdsourcing faces is the cheating behaviour of workers. In [51] reputation-based
incentive protocols are presented. The analysis is done over the presence of many masters that are matched with
workers. The task is assigned to a single worker and payments are ex-ante (i.e., the master pays before the worker
performs the task). They design an algorithm that prevents workers from not putting any effort in performing the
task (i.e., this can be perceived as cheating). Eickhoff and de Vries [18] investigate the nature and the causes for the
cheating behavior of workers in crowdsourcing platforms. They categorize Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) in two
categories: (1) closed class questions where the workers selects the correct answer from a limited list of options, and
(2) open class questions where the answer is not a strict list and/or the task is of a creative nature. In their work they
propose ways to discourage cheaters from performing HITs by transforming the task to be less appealing to them.
Our approach also maintains a reputation for each worker (in order to know how reliable his answers are), but it does
not discourage workers from participating. Instead, it tries to reinforce their good behavior to use them in future
computations. We do not consider here the problem of matching masters and workers, which we assume solved, and
focus on the problem with one master and multiple workers, all of them used by the master.
2 Model
In this section we characterize our model and we present the concepts of auditing, payoffs, rewards and aspiration. We
also give a formal definition of the four reputation types used by our mechanism.
Master-Worker Framework We consider a system consisting of a set G of voluntary workers. The set G is broken
down into disjoint setsWj of size n forming the group of workers receiving a replica of the same tasks. For simplicity
we will focus at only one such set of workers namedW . Hence we consider a master and a set W of n workers. The
computation is broken into rounds, and in each round the master sends a task to the workers to compute and return the
result. Based on the workers’ replies, the master must decide which is the value most likely to be the correct result for
this round. Crowdsourcing applications provide the possibility of selecting workers [5, 37].
Tasks From the perspective of crowdsourcing, tasks are closed class questions, whereas from the perspective of
BOINC-operated applications, they are computations. These tasks have a unique solution; although such limitation
reduces the scope of application of the presented mechanism [46], there are plenty of computations where the correct
solution is unique: e.g., any mathematical function.
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Worker types We consider that workers can be categorized in three types: rational, altruistic andmalicious. Rational
workers are selfish in a game-theoretic sense and their aim is to maximize their utility (benefit). In the context of this
paper, a worker is honest in a round, when it truthfully computes and returns the correct result, and it cheats when
it returns some incorrect value. Altruistic and malicious workers have a predefined behavior, to always be honest or
cheat, respectively. Instead, a rational worker decides to be honest or cheat depending on which strategy maximizes
its utility. We denote by pCi(r) the probability of a rational worker i cheating in round r. This probability is not fixed
and the worker adjusts it over the course of the computation. The master is not aware of the worker types, neither of a
distribution of types (our mechanism does not rely on any statistical information).
While workers make their decision individually and with no coordination, following [39] and [20], we assume
that all the workers that cheat in a round return the same incorrect value; this yields a worst case scenario (and hence
analysis) for the master with respect to obtaining the correct result using mechanisms where the result is the outcome
of voting. It subsumes models where cheaters do not necessarily return the same answer. (This can be seen as a weak
form of collusion.)
For simplicity, unless otherwise stated, we assume that workers do not change their type over time. In practice it
is possible that changes occur. For example, a rational worker might become malicious due to a bug, or a malicious
worker (e.g., a worker under the influence of a virus) become altruistic (e.g., if an antivirus software reinstates it). If
this may happen, then all our results still apply for long enough periods between two changes. (In our simulation study
we do consider scenarios where the workers change their type dynamically.
Auditing, Payoffs, Rewards and Aspiration To induce the rational workers to be honest, the master employs, when
necessary, auditing and reward/punish schemes. The master, in a round, might decide to audit the response of the
workers, at a cost. In this work, auditing means that the master computes the task by itself, and checks which workers
have been honest. We denote by pA(r) the probability of the master auditing the responses of the workers in round r.
The master can change this auditing probability over the course of the computation, but restricted to a minimum value
pminA > 0. When the master audits, it can accurately reward and punish workers. When the master does not audit, it
rewards only those in the weighted majority (see below) of the replies received and punishes no one.
In this work we consider three worker payoff parameters:
(a) WPC : worker’s punishment for being caught cheating,
(b) WCT : worker’s cost for computing a task
(c) WBY : worker’s benefit (typically payment) from the master’s reward.
Also, following [13], we assume that, in every round, a worker i has an aspiration ai: the minimum benefit it expects
to obtain in a round. In order to motivate the worker to participate in the computation, the master usually ensures that
WBY ≥ ai; in other words, the worker has the potential of its aspiration to be covered. We assume that the master
knows the aspirations. Finally, we assume that the master has the freedom of choosing WBY and WPC with goal of
eventual correctness.
Eventual Correctness The goal of the master is to eventually obtain a reliable computational platform: After some
finite number of rounds, the system must guarantee that the master obtains the correct task results in every round with
probability 1 and audits with probability pminA . We call such property eventual correctness.
Reputation The reputation of each worker is measured by the master; a centralized reputation mechanism is used.
In fact, the workers are unaware that a reputation scheme is in place, and their interaction with the master does not
reveal any information about reputation; i.e., the payoffs do not depend on a worker’s reputation.
In this work, we consider four reputation metrics. The first one is analogous to a reputation metric used in [44]
and we call it Linear in this work. Reputation Boinc is inspired by the BOINC’s adaptive replication metric currently
in use [9], while reputation metric Legacy Boinc is inspired by the previously used version of BOINC’s adaptive
replication metric [8]. We present the performance of our system under both BOINC reputation metrics as an op-
portunity to compare and contrast these two schemes within our framework. Finally, the last reputation metric we
consider is reputation Exponential that is not influenced by any other reputation type, and as we show in Section 4 it
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Linear: ρi(r) = (vi(r) + 1)/(aud(r) + 2).
Exponential: ρi(r) = ε
aud(r)−vi(r), for ε ∈ (0, 1), when aud(r) > 0, and ρi(r) = 1/2, otherwise.
Legacy Boinc: Here we define βi(r) as the error rate of worker i at round r. Reputation for this type is calculated as follows:
β(r) =


0.1, if r = 0.
0.95β(r − 1), if r > 0 and worker is truthful in round r.
β(r − 1) + 0.1, otherwise.
ρ(r) =


0.5, if r = 0.
0, if β(r) > 0.05.
1−
√
β(r)
0.05
, otherwise.
Boinc: ρ(r) =
{
0, if streak(r) < 10.
1− 1
streak(r)
, otherwise.
Figure 1: Reputation types.
possesses beneficial properties. In all types, the reputation of a worker is determined based on the number of times
it was found truthful. Hence, the master may update the reputation of the workers only when it audits. We denote
by aud(r) the number of rounds the master audited up to round r, and by vi(r) we refer to the number of auditing
rounds in which worker i was found truthful up to round r. Moreover, we define streaki(r) as the number of rounds
≤ r in which worker i was audited, and replied correctly after the latest round in which it was audited, and caught
cheating. We let ρi(r) denote the reputation of worker i after round r, and for a given set of workers Y ⊆ W we
let ρY (r) =
∑
i∈Y ρi(r) be the aggregated reputation of the workers in Y , by aggregating we refer to summing the
reputation values. Then, the reputation types we consider are detailed in Figure 1.
These four reputation types satisfy the following two natural properties:
A. If a worker is honest when the master audits, the reputation of the worker cannot decrease.
B. If a worker cheats when the master audits, the reputation of the worker cannot increase.
This claim is proven below in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. Natural Property A holds for reputation type Linear, Exponential, Legacy Boinc and Boinc.
Proof. We present separately the proof for each reputation type.
Linear: Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) =
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2 and in the next state the master audits and
the worker is honest then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) =
vi(r)+2
aud(r)+3 . Since
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2 ≤
vi(r)+2
aud(r)+3 the lemma holds for
reputation type Linear.
Exponential: Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = ε
aud(r)−vi(r) and in the next state the master
audits and the worker is honest then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) = ε
aud(r)−vi(r), then the lemma trivially holds for
reputation type Exponential.
Legacy Boinc: At state sr worker i can have reputation ρi(r) ≥ 0 and in the next state the master audits and the worker
is honest then βi(r) < 0.05 and ρi(r + 1) ≥ 0. If in state sr ρi(r) = 0 then the natural property holds. If in state sr,
ρi(r) = 1−
√
βi(r)
0.05 then in the next state ρi(r+1) = 1−
√
βi(r+1)
0.05 . The property still holds since βi(r) < βi(r+1)
and thus the claim is proved for reputation type Legacy Boinc.
Boinc: Three possible cases exist: 1)Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = 0 and streaki(r) < 9
and in the next state the worker is honest, then reputation becomes ρi(r+1) = 0. Since ρi(r) = ρi(r+ 1) the lemma
holds for this case. 2)Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = 0 and streaki(r) = 9 and in the next
state the worker is honest, then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) =
9
10 . Since 0 ≤
9
10 the lemma holds for this case too.
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3)Finally, assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = 1 −
1
streaki(r)
and streaki(r) ≥ 10 and in the next
state the worker is honest, then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) = 1−
1
streaki(r+1)
. Since streaki(r) < streak(r + 1)
then 1 − 1streaki(r) ≤ 1−
1
streaki(r+1)
and the lemma holds for this case. Thus, the lemma for reputation type Boinc
holds since it is true for all three possible cases.
Lemma 2. Natural Property B holds for reputation type Linear, Exponential, Legacy Boinc and Boinc.
Proof. We present separately the proof for each reputation type.
Linear: Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) =
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2 and in the next state the master audits and
the worker cheats then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) =
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+3 . Since
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2 ≥
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+3 the lemma holds.
Exponential: Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = ε
aud(r)−vi(r) and in the next state the mas-
ter audits and the worker cheats then reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) = ε
aud(r)+1−vi(r). Since ε ∈ (0, 1) then
εaud(r)−vi(r) ≥ εaud(r)+1−vi(r) and the lemma holds.
Legacy Boinc: At state sr worker i can have reputation ρi(r) ≥ 0 and in the next state the master audits and the worker
cheats then βi(r + 1) > 0.05 and ρi(r + 1) = 0 and the claim holds.
Boinc: Two possible cases exist: 1)Assume that at state sr worker i has reputation ρi(r) = 0 and streaki(r) < 10
and in the next state the master audits and the worker cheats, then streaki(r + 1) = 0 and reputation becomes
ρi(r + 1) = 0. Since ρi(r) = ρi(r + 1) the lemma holds for this case. 2)Assume that at state sr worker i has
reputation ρi(r) = 1 −
1
streaki(r)
and streaki(r) ≥ 10 and in the next state the master audits and the worker cheats.
Then streaki(r + 1) = 0 and the reputation becomes ρi(r + 1) = 0. Since, 1 −
1
streaki(r)
> 0 the lemma hold also
for this case. Thus, the lemma holds in general.
In each round, when the master does not audit, the result is obtained from the weighted majority as follows.
Consider a round r. Let F (r) denote the subset of workers that returned an incorrect result, i.e., the rational workers
who chose to cheat plus the malicious ones; recall that we assume as a worst case that all cheaters return the same
value. Then,W \F (r) is the subset of workers that returned the correct value, i.e., the rational workers who chose to be
truthful plus the altruistic ones. Then, if ρW\F (r)(r) > ρF (r)(r), the master will accept the correct value, otherwise
it will accept an incorrect value. The mechanism, presented in the next section, employs auditing and appropriate
incentives so that rational workers become truthful and have a reputation that is higher than that of the malicious
workers.
3 Reputation-based Mechanism
We now present our reputation-based mechanism. The mechanism is composed by an algorithm run by the master and
an algorithm run by each worker.
Master’s Algorithm The algorithm begins by choosing the initial probability of auditing and the initial reputation
(same for all workers). The initial probability of auditing will be set according to the information the master has about
the environment (e.g., workers’ initial pC). For example, if it has no information about the environment, a possibly
safe approach is to initially set pA = 0.5. The master also chooses the reputation type to use.
After that, at each round, the master sends a task to all workers and, when all answers are received, the master
audits the answers with probability pA. In the case the answers are not audited, the master accepts the value returned
by the weighed majority, and continues to the next round with the same probability of auditing and the same reputation
values for each worker. In the case the answers are audited, the value pA of the next round is reinforced (i.e., modified
according to the accumulated reputation of the cheaters) and the reputations of the workers are updated based on
their responses. Then, the master rewards/penalizes the workers appropriately. Specifically, if the master audits and a
worker i is a cheater (i.e., i ∈ F ), then Πi = −WPC ; if i is honest, then Πi = WBY . If the master does not audit, and
i returns the value of the weighted majority (i.e., i ∈Wm), then Πi = WBY , otherwise Πi = 0.
We include a threshold, denoted by τ , that represents the master’s tolerance to cheating (typically, we will assume
τ = 1/2 in our simulations). If the ratio of the aggregated reputation of cheaters with respect to the total is larger
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ALGORITHM 1: Master’s Algorithm
pA← x, where x ∈ [p
min
A , 1]
aud = 0
// initially all workers have the same reputation
∀i ∈ W : vi = 0; βi = 0.1; ρi = 0.5; streaki = 0
for r← 1 to∞ do
send a task T to all workers inW
upon receiving all answers do
audit the answers with probability pA
if the answers were not audited then
// weighted majority, coin flip in case of a tie
accept the value returned by workers inWm ⊆W,
where ρWm > ρW\Wm
else // the master audits
aud← aud+ 1
Let F ⊆W be the set of workers that cheated.
∀i ∈ W :
// honest workers
if i /∈ F then vi ← vi + 1 or βi← βi · 0.95 or
streaki← streaki + 1
// cheater workers
else vi← vi or βi← βi + 0.1 or streaki← 0
update reputation ρi of worker i as defined
by reputation type used
if ρW = 0 then pA← min{1, pA + αm} else
pA←min{1,max{p
min
A , pA + αm(
ρF
ρW
− τ )}}
∀i ∈W : return payoff Πito worker i
than τ , pA is increased, and decreased otherwise. The amount by which pA changes depends on the difference
between these values, modulated by a learning rate αm. This latter value determines to what extent the newly acquired
informationwill override the old information. (For example, if αm = 0 the master will never adjust pA.) A pseudocode
of the algorithm described is given as Algorithm 1.
Workers’ Algorithm This algorithm is run only by rational workers (recall that altruistic and malicious workers
have a predefined behavior).1 The execution of the algorithm begins with each rational worker i deciding an initial
probability of cheating pCi. In each round, each worker receives a task from the master and, with probability 1− pCi
computes the task and replies to the master with the correct answer. Otherwise, it fabricates an answer, and sends the
incorrect response to the master. We use a flag Si to model the stochastic decision of a worker i to cheat or not. After
receiving its payoff, each worker i changes its pCi according to payoff Πi, the chosen strategy Si, and its aspiration
ai.
The workers have a learning rate αw. In this work, we assume that all workers have the same learning rate, that is,
they learn in the same manner (see also the discussion in [45]; the learning rate is called step-size there); note that our
analysis can be adjusted to accommodate also workers with different learning rates. A pseudocode of the algorithm is
given as Algorithm 2.
1Since the workers are not aware that a reputation scheme is used, this algorithm is the one considered in [16]; we describe it here for self-
containment.
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ALGORITHM 2: Algorithm for Rational Worker i
pCi← y, where y ∈ [0, 1]
for r← 1 to∞ do
receive a task T from the master
Si←−1 with probability pCi,
and Si← 1 otherwise
if Si = 1 then
σ← compute(T ),
else
σ← arbitrary solution
send response σ to the master
get payoff Πi
if Si = 1 then
Πi← Πi −WCT
pCi← max{0,min{1, pCi − αw(Πi − ai)Si}}
4 Analysis
We now analyze the reputation-based mechanism. We mode the evolution of the mechanism as a Markov Chain, and
then discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving eventual correctness. Modeling a reputation-based
mechanism as a Markov Chain is more involved than previous models that do not consider reputation (e.g. [16]).
The Markov Chain Let the state of the Markov chain be given by a vector s. The components of s are: for the
master, the probability of auditing pA and the number of audits before state s, denoted as aud; and for each rational
worker i, the probability of cheating pCi, the number of validations (i.e., the worker was honest when the master
audited) before state s, denoted as vi, the error rate βi and streaki (the number of consecutive times a workers was
found honest since the last time she cheated). To refer to any component x of vector s we use x(s). Then,
s =
〈
pA(s), aud(s), pC1(s), pC2(s), . . . , pCn(s), v1(s),
v2(s), . . . , vn(s), β1(s), β2(s), . . . , βn(s), streak1(s),
streak2(s), . . . , streakn(s)
〉
.
In order to specify the transition function, we consider the execution of the protocol divided in rounds. In each
round, probabilities and counts (i.e. numbers of validations, audits, error rate and streak) are updated by the mechanism
as defined in Algorithms 1 and 2. The state at the end of round r is denoted as sr. Abusing the notation, we will use
x(r) instead of x(sr) to denote component x of vector sr. The workers’ decisions, the workers’ error rate, the number
of cheaters, and the payoffs of each round r > 0 are the stochastic outcome of the probabilities and counts at the end
of round r − 1. We specify the transition from sr−1 to sr by the actions taken by the master and the workers during
round r.
In the definition of the transition function that follows, the probabilities are limited to pA(s) ∈ [p
min
A , 1] and
for each rational worker i to pCi(s) ∈ [0, 1], for any state s. The initial state s0 is arbitrary but restricted to the
same limitations. Let PF (r) be the probability that the set of cheaters in round r is exactly F ⊆ W . (That is,
PF (r) =
∏
j∈F pCj(r − 1)
∏
k/∈F (1− pCk(r − 1)).) Then, the transition from state sr−1 to sr is as follows.
• Malicious workers always have pC = 1 and altruistic workers always have pC = 0.
• With probability pA(r−1)·PF (r), the master audits when the set of cheaters is F . Then, according to Algorithms 1
and 2, the new state is as follows.
For the master: aud(r) = aud(r−1)+1 and, if ρW (r) > 0 then pA(r) = pA(r−1)+αm (ρF (r)/ρW (r) − τ)
and pA(r) = min{1, pA + αm} otherwise.
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(1) For each worker i ∈ F : vi(r) = vi(r − 1), βi(r) = βi(r − 1) + 0.1 and streaki(r) = 0 and, if i is rational,
then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1)− αw(ai +WPC).
(2) For each worker i /∈ F : vi(r) = vi(r− 1)+1, βi(r) = βi(r− 1) · 0.95 and streaki(r) = streaki(r− 1)+1
and, if i is rational, then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1) + αw(ai − (WBY −WCT )).
• With probability (1 − pA(r − 1))PF (r), the master does not audit when the set of cheaters is F . Then, according
to Algorithms 1 and 2, the following updates are carried out.
For the master: pA(r) = pA(r − 1) and aud(r) = aud(r − 1).
For each worker i ∈W : vi(r) = vi(r − 1).
For each rational worker i ∈ F ,
(3) if ρF (r) > ρW\F (r) then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1) + αw(WBY − ai),
(4) if ρF (r) < ρW\F (r) then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1)− αw · ai,
For each rational worker i /∈ F ,
(5) if ρF (r) > ρW\F (r) then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1) + αw(ai +WCT ),
(6) if ρF (r) < ρW\F (r) then pCi(r) = pCi(r − 1) + αw(ai − (WBY −WCT )).
Recall that in case of a tie in the weighted majority, the master flips a coin to choose one of the answers, and assigns
payoffs accordingly. If that is the case, transitions (3)–(6) apply according to that outcome.
Conditions for Eventual Correctness We show now the conditions under which the system can guarantee eventual
correctness. The analysis is carried out for a universal class of reputation functions characterized by two properties.
Property 1 states that if the master audits in consecutive rounds, the aggregated reputation of the honest workers will be
larger than that of cheater workers in a bounded number of rounds. Property 2 states that if the aggregated reputation
of a set X ⊂ W is larger than that of a set Y ⊂W , then it remains so if the master audits and all workers are honest.
The two properties are formally stated below.
Property 1: For any constant δ > 0, there is a bounded value γ(δ) such that, for any non-emptyX ⊆ W and
any initial state sr in which vi(r) = 0, ∀i /∈ X , if theMarkov chain evolves in such a way that ∀k = 1, . . . , γ(δ),
it holds that aud(r + k) = aud(r) + k, ∀i ∈ X, vi(r + k) = vi(r) + k and ∀j ∈ W \X, vj(r + k) = vj(r),
then ρX(r + γ(δ)) > δ · ρW\X(r + γ(δ)).
Property 2: For anyX ⊂W and Y ⊂W , if aud(r+1) = aud(r)+1 and ∀j ∈ X∪Y it is vj(r+1) = vj(r)+1
then ρX(r) > ρY (r) ⇒ ρX(r + 1) > ρY (r + 1).
Reputations Linear, Exponential and Boinc (cf. Section 2) satisfy Property 1, while reputation Legacy Boinc as
defined does not. However, if a constant upper bound in the value of βi(r) is established, we obtain an adapted version
of Legacy Boinc reputation that satisfies Property 1. Regarding Property 2, while reputation Exponential satisfies it,
reputation Linear, Legacy Boinc and Boinc do not. The proofs of these facts are presented below. Moreover, as we
show below (Theorem 10), this makes a difference with respect to guaranteeing eventual correctness.
Lemma 3. Property 1 holds for reputation Linear, while Property 2 does not .
Proof. First we show that Property 1 holds. Consider any d > 0, any X ⊆ W non empty. Without loss of generality
assume |X | = k. Consider rounds r + 1, . . . r + j, for some j, such that the master audits, workers in X are honest
and workers not in X cheat. For ∀i ∈ X , ρi(r + j) =
vi(r)+j+1
aud(r)+j+2 ; and ∀i /∈ X , ρi(r + j) =
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+j+2 . Then
ρX(r+ j) =
∑
i∈X ρi(r+ j) =
∑
i∈X
vi(r)
aud(r)+j+2 +
k(j+1)
aud(r)+j+2 ≥
j+1
aud(r)+j+2 ; and pW\X(r+ j) =
∑
i∈W\X ρi(r+ j) =
(n+k)
aud(r)+j+2 ≤
n+1
aud(r)+j+2 . For any j ≤ δ(n− 1) we have, ρX(r + j) ≥
j+1
aud(r)+j+2 >
δ(n−1)
aud(r)+j+2 ≥ ρW\X(r + j).
Hence, setting γ(δ) = δ(n− 1) proves the first part of the claim.
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We now show that Property 2 does not hold. Consider any round where aud(r+1) = aud(r)+1 and ∀j ∈ X ∪Y
vj(r + 1) = vj(r) + 1. Without lose of generality assume that in state sr, |X | = kr. Then we have that if,
ρX(r) > ρY (r)
∑
i∈X
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2
>
∑
i∈Y
vi(r)+1
aud(r)+2
∑
i∈X vi(r)
aud(r)+2
+ kr
aud(r)+2
>
∑
i∈Y vi(r)
aud(r)+2
+ n−kr
aud(r)+2
∑
i∈X vi(r) + kr >
∑
i∈Y vi(r) + n− kr
then,
ρX(r + 1) > ρY (r + 1)
∑
i∈X
vi(r)+2
aud(r)+3
>
∑
i∈Y
vi(r)+2
aud(r)+3
∑
i∈X vi(r)
aud(r)+3
+
2kr+1
aud(r)+3
>
∑
i∈Y vi(r)
aud(r)+3
+
2(n−kr+1)
aud(r)+3
∑
i∈X vi(r) + 2kr+1 >
∑
i∈Y vi(r) + 2(n− kr+1)
Thus if kr 6= kr+1 then the entailment may not hold.
Lemma 4. Property 1 and 2 hold for reputation Exponential.
Proof. First we show that Property 1 holds. Consider any δ > 0, any X ⊆ W non empty. Without loss of generality
assume |X | = k. Consider rounds r + 1, . . . r + j, for some j, such that the master audits, workers in X are honest
and workers not in X cheat. For ∀i ∈ X , ρi(r + j) = ε
aud(r)−vi(r) and ∀i /∈ X , ρi(r + j) = ε
aud(r)+j−vi(r).Then
ρX(r + j) =
∑
i∈X ρi(r + j) =
∑
i∈X ε
aud(r)−vi(r) ≥ εaud(r) and ρW\X(r + j) =
∑
i∈W\X ρi(r + j) =∑
i∈W\X ε
aud(r)+j−vi(r) ≤ (n − 1)εaud(r)+j. For any j < −log(δ(n − 1)) we have, ρX(r + j) ≥ ε
aud(r) >
δ(n− 1)εaud(r)+j ≥ ρW\X(r + j). Hence, setting γ(δ) < −log(δ(n− 1)) proves the claim.
Nowwe show that also Property 2 holds. Consider anyX ⊂W and Y ⊂W . Then if ρX(r) =
∑
i∈X ε
aud(r)−vi(r)
then ρX(r+1) =
∑
i∈X ε
aud(r)+1−vi(r)−1 =
∑
i∈X ε
aud(r)−vi(r). If ρY (r) =
∑
i∈Y ε
aud(r)−vi(r) then ρY (r+1) =∑
i∈Y ε
aud(r)+1−vi(r)−1 =
∑
i∈Y ε
aud(r)−vi(r). Thus trivially the condition ρX(r) > ρY (r) ⇒ ρX(r + 1) >
ρY (r + 1) holds.
Lemma 5. Property 1 does not hold for reputation Legacy Boinc, unless an upper bound b of the value βi(r) is
established;Property 2 does not hold for reputation Legacy Boinc.
Proof. First we show that Property 1 does not hold. Consider any δ > 0, andX ⊆W non empty. Without loss of gen-
erality assume |X | = k. Consider rounds r + 1 . . . r + j for some j, such that master audits, workers inX are honest
and workers not inX cheat. For ∀i ∈ X if βi(r+ j) > 0.05 then ρi(r+ j) = 0 else ρi(r+ j) = 1−
√
βi(r)×j×0.95
0.05 .
For ∀i ∈ W \X then βi(r + j) > 0.05 thus ρi(r + j) = 0. If γ(δ) > 0 then ∀i ∈ W \ X ρi(r + j) = 0.To have
ρX(r+γ(δ)) > δρW\X(r+γ(δ)) we need to know the state sr where the master starts to audit to know in how many
rounds ∃i ∈ X where βi(r) ≤ 0.05. Thus the condition of Property 1 for Legacy Boinc depends on the current state
sr where the master begins to audit. Hence Property 1 for reputation Legacy Boinc does not hold.
Now, we show that if an upper bound b of the value βi(r) is established then Property 1 holds for reputation
Legacy Boinc. Consider any δ > 0, and X ⊆ W non empty. Without loss of generality assume |X | = k. Consider
rounds r + 1 . . . r + j for some j, such that master audits, workers in X are honest and workers not in X cheat. For
∀i ∈ X if βi(r + j) > 0.05 then ρi(r + j) = 0 else ρi(r + j) = 1 −
√
βi(r)×j×0.95
0.05 . For ∀i ∈ W \ X then
βi(r + j) > 0.05 thus ρi(r + j) = 0. If γ(δ) > 0 then ∀i ∈W \X ρi(r + j) = 0. If a constant upper bound b in the
value of βi(r) is established in the sr state then in j <
0.05
b×0.95 rounds ∀i ∈ X , ρi(r + j) > 0 and thus the condition
ρX(r + γ(δ)) > δρW\X(r + γ(δ)) becomes true by setting γ(δ) <
0.05
b×0.95 and the claim is proved.
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Finally, we show that Property 2 does not hold. Consider any X ⊂ W and Y ⊂ W . If ρX(r) > ρY (r) then
in the next state sr+1 the following apply. For ∀j ∈ X \ Y , vj(r + 1) = vj(r) + 1 (they are honest). Thus if
βj(r + 1) > 0.05 then ρj(r + 1) = 0 else ρj(r + 1) = 1 −
√
βj(r)×0.95
0.05 . Consider the following case where
∀j ∈ Y , ρj(r) = 0 and ∀j ∈ X
′, where X ′ is the set of all workers in X besides one, lets name it z, ρj(r) = 0 and
ρz(r) = 1 −
√
βz(r)×0.95
0.05 . Then ρX(r) > ρY (r) holds. In the next round though there is a possibility that ∀j ∈ Y ,
ρj(r + 1) = 1 −
√
βj(r+1)×0.95
0.05 , while only the reputation of z changes in the next state for the X set. Thus if
1 −
√
βz(r)×0.95
0.05 < |Y | × (1 −
√
βj(r+1)×0.95
0.05 ) then Property 2 does not hold for reputation Legacy Boinc and the
claim is proved.
Lemma 6. Property 1 holds for reputation Boinc, while Property 2 does not hold when n > 2.
Proof. First we show that Property 1 holds. Consider any δ > 0, and X ⊆ W non empty. Without loss of generality
assume |X | = k. Consider rounds r + 1 . . . r + j for some j, such that master audits, workers in X are honest and
workers not in X cheat. For ∀i ∈ X we have ρi(r + j) = 1 −
1
streaki(r+j)
if streaki(r + j) ≥ 10. For ∀i /∈ X
ρi(r + j) = 0 since streaki(r + j) = 0. Thus, ρX(r + j) =
∑
i∈X ρi(r + j) =
∑
i∈X(1 −
1
streaki(r+j)
) =
k(1 − 1streaki(r+j) ) > ρW\X(r + j) =
∑
i∈W\X ρi(r + j) = 0. Thus, in order for ρX(r + γ(δ)) > δρW\X(r+γ(δ))
to be true we need to set γ(δ) ≥ 10.
We now show that Property 2 does not hold when n > 2. Consider any round where aud(r + 1) = aud(r) + 1
and ∀j ∈ X ∪ Y vj(r + 1) = vj(r) + 1. Then, for anyX ⊂W and Y ⊂W it must hold that if ρX(r) > ρY (r) then
ρX(r + 1) > ρY (r + 1) . Thus, consider state sr where |X | = 1, |Y | = n − 1 and ∀i ∈ X streaki(r) ≥ 10 and
∀i ∈ Y streaki(r) = 9. It is true that ρX(r) = 1−
1
streaki(r)
= 1 − 110+δ > ρY (r) = (n− 1) · 0 = 0 where δ > 1.
Now, in the next state sr+1 we have ρX(r+1) = 1−
1
streaki(r+1)
= 1− 110+δ+1 < 1 and ρY (r+1) = (n−1)(1−
1
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⇒ n− 2 < ρY (r + 1) < n− 1. If n > 2 then ρX(r + 1) < ρY (r + 1) and the claim does not. Thus Property 2 does
not hold for reputation Boinc when n > 2.
Moving on we present the conditions under which the system can guarantee eventual correctness, but before that
we establish the terminology that will be used throughout. For any given state s, a set X of workers is called a
reputable set if ρX(r) > ρW\X(r). In any given state s, let a worker i be called an honest worker if pCi(s) = 0.
Let a state s be called a truthful state if the set of honest workers in state s is reputable. Let a truthful set be any set
of truthful states. Let a worker be called a covered worker if the payoff of returning the correct answer is at least its
aspiration plus the computing cost. I.e., for a covered worker i, it is WBY ≥ ai + WCT . We refer to the opposite
cases as uncovered worker (WBY < ai + WCT ), cheater worker (pCi(s) = 1), untruthful state (the set of cheaters
in that state is reputable), and untruthful set, respectively. Let a set of states S be called closed if, once the chain is in
any state s ∈ S, it will not move to any state s′ /∈ S. (A singleton closed set is called an absorbing state.) For any
given set of states S, we say that the chain reaches (resp. leaves) the set S if the chain reaches some state s ∈ S (resp.
reaches some state s /∈ S).
In the master’s algorithm, a non-zero probability of auditing is always guaranteed. This is a necessary condi-
tion. Otherwise, unless the altruistic workers outnumber the rest, a closed untruthful set is reachable, as we show in
Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Consider any set of workers Z ⊆W such thatWBY > ai, for every rational worker i ∈ Z . Consider the
set of states
S = {s|(pA(s) = 0) ∧ (∀w ∈ Z : pCw(s) = 1)
∧(ρZ(s) > ρW−Z(s))}.
Then,
(i) S is a closed untruthful set, and
(ii) if pA(0) = 0, ρZ(0) > ρW−Z(0), and for all i ∈ Z it is pCi(0) > 0, then, S is reachable.
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Proof. (i) Each state in S is untruthful, since the workers in Z are all cheaters and Z is a reputable set. Since pA = 0,
the master never audits, and the reputations are never updated. From transition (3) it can be seen that, if the chain is in
a state of the set S before round r, for each worker i ∈ Z , it holds pCi(r) ≥ pCi(r − 1) = 1. Hence, once the chain
has reached a state in the set S, it will move only to states in the set S. Thus, S is a closed untruthful set.
(ii) We show now that S is reachable from the initial state under the above conditions. Because pA and the
reputations only change when the master audits, we have that pA(0) = 0 =⇒ pA(s) = 0 and ρZ(0) > ρW−Z(0) =⇒
ρZ(s) > ρW−Z(s), for any state s. Malicious workers always have pC = 1, and no altruistic worker may be contained
in Z because pCi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ Z . Thus, to complete the proof it is enough to show that eventually it is pC = 1 for
all the workers in L, which is the set of rational workers in Z . Given that for each rational worker j ∈ L, pCj(0) > 0
and WBY > aj , from transition (3) it can be seen that there is a non-zero probability of moving from s0 to a state s1
where the same conditions apply and pCj(1) > pCj(0) for each rational worker j ∈ L. Hence, applying the argument
inductively, there is a non-zero probability of reaching S.
Eventual correctness follows if we can show that the Markov chain always ends in a closed truthful set, with
pA = p
min
A . We prove first that having at least one worker that is altruistic or covered rational is necessary for a closed
truthful set to exist. Then we prove that it is also sufficient if all rational workers are covered.
Lemma 8. If all workers are malicious or uncovered rationals, no truthful set S is closed, if the reputation type
satisfies Property 2.
Proof. Let us consider some state s of a truthful set S. Let Z be the set of honest workers in s. Since s is truthful ,
then Z is reputable. Since there are no altruistic workers, the workers in Z must be uncovered rational. Let us assume
that being in state s the master audits in round r. From Property 2, since all nodes in Z are honest in r, Z is reputable
after r. From transition (2), after round r, each worker i ∈ Z has pCi(r) > 0. Hence, the new state is not truthful ,
and S is not closed.
Lemma 9. Consider a reputation type that satisfies Properties 1 and 2. If all rational workers are covered and at
least one worker is altruistic or rational, a closed truthful set S is reachable from any initial state. Moreover, in every
state s ∈ S, pA(s) = p
min
A .
Proof. Let X be the set of altruistic and rational workers, and consider any initial state sr. Let us define a constant
δ = max{1, (1− τ + η/αm)/(τ + η/αm)}, for a fixed constant η ∈ (0, ταm). We consider the following cases.
1. In state sr not all the workers in X are truthful. Let us assume then that in the next ⌈
1
αw(aj−WPC)
⌉ rounds the
master audits and any worker i that has pCi > 0 in the round cheats. Then, from transition (1) and the fact that
all rational workers are covered, after these ⌈ 1αw(aj−WPC)⌉ rounds all the workers in X are truthful. Then, we
end up in one of the following three cases.
2. In state sr all the workers inX are truthful, and ρX(r) ≤ δ ·ρW\X(r). Consider the value γ(δ) given in Property
1. Assume that in each of the following γ(δ) rounds the master audits. The workers in W \ X are malicious,
hence, it holds that ∀ /∈ X : vi(r) = 0. Then, in these rounds all workers in X are honest (every worker in X
remains truthful from transition (2) and the fact that all rational workers are covered) and all workers inW \X
cheat because they are malicious. Therefore, it holds that ∀i /∈ X : ∀j ∈ [r, r + γ(δ)] : vi(j) = 0. Then, from
Property 1, after the γ(δ) rounds we have that ρX(r + γ(δ)) > δ · ρW\X(r + γ(δ)). Then, we are in one of the
following two cases.
3. In state sr all the workers in X are truthful, ρX(r) > δ · ρW\X(r), and pA(r) > p
min
A . Let us assume that in
the next ⌈pA(r)/η⌉ rounds the master audits. Then, as in the previous case, in these rounds all workers inX are
honest and all workers inW \X cheat. Hence, the property that ρX(r + k) > δ · ρW\X(r + k) holds for each
round r + k, for k = 1, . . . , ⌈pA(r)/η⌉. Then, by the definition of δ and the update of pA, in each round pA is
decremented by η (more precisely, by min{η, pA}). Hence, by round r + ⌈pA(r)/η⌉ it holds that pA = p
min
A .
Then, we are in the following case.
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4. In state sr all the workers in X are truthful, ρX(r) > δ · ρW\X(r), and pA(r) = p
min
A . Then, all subsequent
states satisfy all these properties, and define the set S, independently of whether the master audits or not (from
transition (2) and (6), the fact that δ ≥ 1, Property 2, and the update of pA). This complete the proof.
Now, combining Lemmas 8 and 9 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 10. In a system where (1) the reputation type used satisfies Properties 1 and 2, and (2) all rational workers
are covered, having at least one altruist or rational worker is a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee eventual
correctness. That is, from any initial state, to eventually reach a closed truthful set S where the master audits with
probability pminA .
If there is no knowledge on the distribution of the workers among the three types (altruistic, malicious and ratio-
nals), the only strategy to make sure eventual correctness is achieved, if possible, is to cover all workers. Of course, if
all workers are malicious there is no possibility of reaching eventual correctness.
5 Simulations
Our analysis has shown that reaching eventual correctness is feasible under certain conditions. Once the system enters
a state of eventual correctness we are in an optimal state where the master always receives the correct task reply by
auditing with a minimum probability. What is left to be clarified is under which cost eventual correctness is reached.
Cost can be measured in terms of 1) reliability, 2) auditing, 3) payment to the workers and 4) time until eventual
correctness is reached. Under these parameters we provide a comparison of the system’s performance under the
different reputation types and we are able to identify the scenarios under which every reputation type is performing
best.
We present simulations for a variety of parameter combinations similar to the values observed in real systems
(extracted from [4, 19]). We have designed our own simulation setup by implementing our mechanism (the master’s
and the workers’ algorithms, including the four types of reputation discussed above) using C++. The simulations were
contacted on a dual-core AMD Opteron 2.5GHz processor, with 2GB RAM running CentOS version 5.3.
General setting
We consider a total of 9 workers as an appropriate degree of redundancy to depict the changes that different ratios of
rational, altruistic or malicious workers will induce in the system. SETI-like systems usually use three workers, but
using such a degree of redundancywould not allow us to present a rich account of the system’s evolution. Additionally,
by selecting 9 redundant workers we are able to capture systems that are more critical and aim at a higher degree of
redundancy. The chosen parameters are indicated in the figures. As for the intrinsic parameter of the aspiration level
we consider for simplicity of presentation that all workers have the same aspiration level ai = 0.1; although we have
checked that with random values the results are similar to those presented here, provided their variance is not very
large. We set the learning rate to a small constant value, as it is discussed in [45] (called step-size there), this is the
general conversion when a learning process is assumed. Thus we consider the same learning rate for the master and
the workers, i.e., α = αm = αw = 0.1. We set τ = 0.5 (which means that the master will not tolerate a majority of
cheaters), pminA = 0.01 and ε = 0.5 in reputation Exponential. We use WBY = 1, as the normalization parameter for
all the results presented. Finally, the presented results are an average of 10 executions of the implementation, unless
otherwise stated (when we show the behavior of typical, individual realizations). Usually we choose to depict the
evolution of pA since it is an important measure of cost for the master. In all of the depicted results in all the Figures
presented here we have verified that if pA = p
min
A then the system has already reached a state where the master
receives always the correct reply, and hence eventual correctness is reached. By convention for clarity of presentation,
we will simply say that the system has reached convergence once pA = p
min
A . Finally, we define
∑
i∈W ρiSi/|W |
as the reputation ratio. This quantity will allow us to see the overall reputation of the workers in the system and is
indicative of the existence of honest workers with higher overall reputation than cheaters.
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Figure 2: Rational workers. Auditing probability of the master as a function of time (number of rounds) for parameters
pA = 0.5, α = 0.1, ai = 0.1, τ = 0.5,WBY = 1,WPC = 0 andWCT = 0.1. (a) initial pC = 0.5 (b) initial pC = 1.
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Figure 3: Rational workers, for an individual realization with initially pC = 0.5, pA = 0.5, τ = 0.5, WBY = 1,
WCT = 0.1, WPC = 0, α = 0.1 and ai = 0.1. (a) reputation Linear, (b) reputation Exponential, (c) reputation
Legacy Boinc, (d) reputation Boinc.
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We consider a variety of different scenarios where only rational workers exist in the computation or where the
master decided to cover the aspired amount of payment to only a small number of workers. We also consider the case
where more than one type of workers co-exist in the same computation. Finally we also consider the case where some
workers change type after eventual correctness is reached. Under these rich account of difference scenarios we are
able to compare the four reputation types and record the system’ s behavior before eventual correctness is reached.
Notice that in all the figures’ legends we refer to reputation type Linear as type 1, to type Exponential as type 2, to
type Legacy Boinc as type 3 and finally to type Boinc as type 4.
Presence of only rational workers
In crowdsourcing systems like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk the majority of workers participating in the platform are
driven by monetary incentives, thus exhibiting a rational behavior where their goal is to maximize their profit. Hence,
the presence of only rational workers is plausible in some real system examples. In this scenario we cover all the
workers, that is,WBY > a+WCT .
Figure 2 depicts the auditing probability of the master at each round for all 4 reputation types and the case where
a mechanism without reputation is used (see [16]). Figure 2 (a) shows the case where the rational workers linger
between cheating or being honest in the first round of interaction by setting pC = 0.5. Also the master takes an
approach of ignorance by setting pA = 0.5 and not punishing the workers. Under this mild approach of the master in
all 4 reputation types the system converges in roughly 100 rounds. While in the case where the master does not use
reputation the system converges a bit earlier. On the other hand pA at each round is the lowest for reputation Legacy
Boinc while it is the highest for reputation Boinc. In particular for Boinc the pA increases in the initial rounds before
decreasing. This behavior is correlated with the fact that Boinc is a type that is based on a threshold, it needs 10
consecutive correct replies for a worker to increase her reputation from zero. This is also verified by the evolution of
the reputation of Boinc in Figure 3 (d). Reputation Legacy Boinc (Figure 3(c)), on the other hand, allows for dramatic
increases and decreases of reputation. This is a result of the indirect way we calculate reputation Legacy Boinc, as we
mentioned above. Notice that in reputation Exponential (Figure 3(b)) reputation takes values between (0,0.3). This
happens because when the master catches a worker cheating, its reputation decreases exponentially, never increasing
again. Finally, reputation Linear (Figure 3(a)) leads rational workers to reputation values close to 1 (at a rate that
depends on the value of the initial pC ) since it is a linear function.
In Figure 2 (b) now we assume that the workers are more aggressive towards the system starting with an initial
pC = 1 . In this case convergence comes roughly around 120-150 rounds for reputation Linear, Exponential, Boinc
and the case of no reputation. For reputation Legacy Boinc convergence comes later, roughly in 200 rounds, but pA
until convergence is lower in the first 50 rounds.
In general from Figure 2 we can see that the mechanism of [16] (without the reputation scheme) is enough to
bring rational workers to produce the correct output, precisely because of their rationality. Thus if the master can be
certain that only rational workers will take part in the computation is better to use the mechanism of [16]. But if such a
knowledge is not available then selecting reputation Exponential is the best option. Reputation Legacy Boinc performs
better when pC = 0.5 while it has a poor performance in the case where pC = 1. As for reputation Linear it is always
slightly under performing Exponential and reputation Boinc has a bad performance when pC = 0.5.
Covering only a subset of rational workers
In the previous paragraph we considered only cases where the master was covering all workers, that is, WBY >
a +WCT for all workers. For the case with malicious workers, as explained in Section 4, this is unavoidable if the
worker’s type distribution is not known. But if we know that only rational workers exist then maybe by covering only
a subset of them the system can reach eventual correctness, a scenario that we now explore. Covering only a subset of
the rational workers will decrease the cost of the master in terms of payment but might actually increase the cost of
auditing. This precisely is the relationship we want to explore.
In Figure 4 the correct reply rate as a function of time is presented for the case where the master covers only
one worker. In a time window of 2000 rounds, as observed only reputation Exponential is able to reach eventual
correctness. Even in reputation Boinc where the system looks like converged it allows themaster to receive an incorrect
reply. In this scenario the master has a tolerance of τ = 0.5 and does not punish the workers WPC = 0. As we can
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Figure 4: Correct reply rate as a function of time in the presence of only rational workers. Parameters are initial
pA = 0.5,WBY = 1, WCT = 0.1, WPC = 0 and α = 0.1, ai = 0.1, τ = 0.5. Reputation types Linear, Legacy
Boinc and Boinc have initial pC = 0.5, while in Exponential, pC = 1.
see thought in other scenarios (see Figure 5) where the tolerance is minimum and the master punishes the workers,
the situation remains the same; the system reaches eventual correctness only when Exponential is used. In the case of
Linear in Figure 5(b1) although the master always received the correct reply, the master must always audit with pA
close to 1. The reason why only reputation Exponential is able to reach eventual correctness is because it is the only
reputation type that fulfils Property 2. Under this property the reputation of the leading group of honest workers will
never be able to surpass the reputation of the rest of the workers. Thus uncovered workers that periodically cheat only
when the master does not audit will not be able to have a greater reputation than the covered workers. Thus the system
will be able to always receive the correct reply from the covered worker that has the highest reputation than the rest of
the workers’ aggregated reputations, while reducing the auditing probability to minimum.
If the master covers the majority of workers then the system converges in most of the cases for different reputation
types. In Figure 6 we can observe that reputation Exponential and Boinc converge in roughly the same amount of time
in all the cases we examine. On the other hand reputation Linear does not converge in the case where the tolerance
is low and the master punishes (see Figure 6(b1)). In this case the auditing probability is close to 1 meaning that this
type of reputation was not sufficient to identify the covered rationals and form a trusted majority reputation forcing
the master to audit almost at every round in order to obtain the correct reply. Also reputation Legacy Boinc was not
able to converge although the auditing probability is less than a half the master does not always receive the correct task
result.
This lead us to conclude that is best for the master to use reputation Exponential in the case that the master can
not cover the aspiration of more than one worker. If the master can cover move than the majority of workers then both
reputation Exponential and Boinc are suitable. Comparing these results (see Figure 5(a2) and Figure 6(a2)&(a4)) with
the ones of Figure 2(b) we notice that the master does not need more auditing in the case of covering only a number
of workers,what is perhaps counter-intuitive, thus our assumption was wrong. If the master is in a system where only
rational workers exist then by using reputation Exponential she could guarantee eventual correctness by covering only
one worker. Our analysis has indicated that a few bad cases exist where the system might actually not converge if not
all the workers are covered even for Exponential. Although these are extreme cases as our simulations show, when a
critical application exist that needs correctness of results such a risk can not be taken to reduce the costs of the master.
Different types of workers
Moving on, we evaluate our different reputation schemes in scenarios where malicious workers exist (this was
the reason for introducing reputation at the first place). Figure 7 shows results for the extreme case, with malicious
workers, no altruistic workers, and rational workers that initially cheat with probability pC = 1. We observe that
if the master does not use reputation and a majority of malicious workers exist, then the master is enforced by the
mechanism to audit in every round. Even with a majority of rational workers, it takes a long time for the master to
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Figure 5: One covered worker. Parameters areWCT = 0.1, ai = 0.1, α = 0.1, andWBY = 0.1 (uncovered workers)
/ WBY = 1 (covered workers). Master’s auditing probability, audit percentage and correct reply percentage as a
function of time. First row: reputation Linear, initial pC = 0.5. Second row: reputation Exponential, initial pC = 1.
Third row: reputation Legacy Boinc, initial pC = 0.5. Fourth row: reputation Boinc, initial pC = 0.5. First column
τ = 0.5,WPC = 0. Second column, τ = 0.1,WPC = 0. Third column, τ = 0.1,WPC = 1.
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Figure 6: Five covered workers. Parameters are WCT = 0.1, ai = 0.1, α = 0.1, initial pC = 1 and WBY = 0.1
(uncovered workers) /WBY = 1 (covered workers). Master’s auditing probability, audit percentage and correct reply
percentage as a function of time. First row: reputation Linear. Second row: reputation Exponential. Third row:
reputation Legacy Boinc. Forth row: reputation Boinc. Left column: τ = 0.5, WPC = 0. Middle column: τ = 0.1,
WPC = 0. Right column: τ = 0.1,WPC = 1.
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Figure 7: Master’s auditing probability as a function of time in the presence of rational and malicious workers. Param-
eters in all plots, rationals’ initial pC = 1, master’s initial pA = 0.5,WBY = 1,WCT = 0.1,WPC = 0 and α = 0.1,
ai = 0.1. In (a) 4 malicious and 5 rationals, (b) 5 malicious and 4 rationals , (c) 8 malicious and 1 rational.
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Figure 8: Master’s auditing probability as a function of time in the presence of altruistic and malicious workers.
Parameters in all plots, master’s initial pA = 0.5, WCT = 0.1, WPC = 0 and α = 0.1, ai = 0.1. In (a) master
does not use reputation, (b) master uses reputation Linear, (c) master uses reputation Exponential, (d) master uses
reputation Legacy Boinc, (e) master uses reputation Boinc.
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reach pminA , if reputation is not used. Introducing reputation can indeed cope with the challenge of having a majority of
malicious workers, except (obviously) when all workers are malicious. For Linear, the larger the number of malicious
workers, the slower the master reaches pminA . On the contrary, the time to convergence to the p
min
A is independent of
the number of malicious workers for reputation Exponential. This is due to the different dynamical behavior of the
two reputations as discussed before. For reputation Legacy Boinc, if a majority of rationals exists then convergence is
slower. This is counter-intuitive, but it is linked to the way reputation and error rate are calculated. On the other hand,
with Legacy Boinc, pA is slightly lower in the first rounds. As for reputation Boinc the convergence time and the
behavior of the evolution of pA is similar to reputation Exponential but in the initial rounds pA = 1 for a larger period
of time, providing an additional cost to the master. Given the above observations we can conclude that reputation
Exponential has a slight advantage in all the scenarios considered (with and without a majority of rational workers) in
therms of auditing cost to the master.
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Figure 9: Presence of 4 malicious and 5 rational workers, only 1 rational worker is covered. Audit probability as
function of time and correct reply percentage as a function of time. (a) Reputation Linear. (b) Reputation Exponential.
(c) Reputation Legacy Boinc. (d) Reputation Boinc.
We have checked the behavior of the system in the case where only malicious and altruistic workers exist in the
system (see Figure 8). As expected, if the majority of the workers is malicious and the mechanism does not use a
reputation scheme the system can not converge. For the first three reputation types the mechanism converge fast and
efficiently (without increasing the initial auditing probability) for the case of 4 malicious and 5 altruistic and for the
case of 5 malicious and 4 altruistic. Now for the case of 8 malicious and 1 altruistic the optimum result is given
by reputation Legacy Boinc while reputation Exponential has comparably good results with a slight increment of the
auditing probability in the fist rounds and convergence time around the same interval. Reputation Boinc as we can
see gives the worst results with the auditing probability increasing to 1 before being able to decrease. The simulations
where all three types of workers co-exist are omitted since adding altruistic workers in a system with malicious and
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rational workers only aids the convergence of the system without providing us with any useful inside.
In Figure 9, we take a look at the case when the master decides to cover one worker out of 5 rationals and 4
malicious and that worker is rational. We notice that the system is performing in an analogous manner as in the case
where all workers are covered. Only the mechanism that uses reputation Exponential is able to converge while when
reputation Boinc is use the system performs quit well but still is unable to converge even after the 1000 round.
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Figure 10: Correct reply rate as a function of time. Presence of 5 malicious workers on the 500th round. Parameters
are initial pA = 0.5,WBY = 1,WCT = 0.1,WPC = 0 and α = 0.1, ai = 0.1, τ = 0.5, initial pC = 1.
Dynamic change of roles
As a further check of the stability of our procedure, we now study the case when after correctness is reached some
workers change their type, possibly due to a software or hardware error. We simulate a situation in which 5 out of 9
rational workers suddenly change their behavior to malicious at time 500, a worst-case scenario. Figure 10 shows that
after the rational behavior of 5 workers turns to malicious, convergence is reached again after a few hundred rounds
and eventual correctness resumes. As we see from Figure 11, it takes more time for reputation Exponential to deal
with the changes in the workers’ behavior, because this reputation can never increase, and hence the system will reach
eventual correctness only when the reputation of the workers that turned malicious becomes less than the reputation
of the workers that stayed rational. It also takes more time for reputation Legacy Boinc to deal with the changes in the
workers’ behavior (see Figure 11). In the case of reputation Linear, not only the reputation of the workers that turned
malicious decreases, but also the reputation of the workers that stayed rational increases. As for reputation Boinc it
take a bit more time than reputation Linear to reach eventual correctness again after the change of behavior.
Therefore, reputation Linear exhibits better performance in dealing with dynamic changes of behavior than rep-
utation types Exponential, Legacy Boinc and Boinc. As Figure 12 depicts though the auditing probability of Linear
and Legacy Boinc is drastically increasing when the change of behavior happens while for reputation Exponential and
Boinc this is not the case.
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Figure 11: Presence of 5 malicious workers on the 500th round. Workers’ reputation as a function of time, audit
occurrences as a function of time and reputation ratio as a function of time, for an individual realization. Parameters
in all panels, initial pC = 1, initial pA = 0.5,WCT = 0.1,WPC = 0 and α = 0.1, ai = 0.1, τ = 0.5. (a) Reputation
Linear, (b) reputation Exponential, (c) reputation Legacy Boinc and (d) reputation Boinc.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we study a malicious-tolerant generic mechanism that uses reputation. We consider four reputation types,
and give provable guarantees that only reputation Exponential (introduced in this work) provides eventual correctness.
Simulations have shown that in the case of having all rational workers covered, eventual correctness is achieved by all
four types. In the case of covering only one altruistic or rational worker, simulations have shown that only reputation
Exponential can achieve eventual correctness. We show that reputation Exponential has more potential in commercial
platforms where high reliability together with low auditing cost, rewarding few workers and fast convergence are
required. We believe this advances the development of reliable commercial Internet-based Master-Worker Computing
services. In particular, our simulations reveal interesting tradeoffs between reputation types and parameters and show
that our mechanism is a generic one that can be adjusted to various settings.
The analysis of the system is done assuming that workers have an implicit form of collusion. I.e., we assume
that all misbehaving workers reply with the same answer and all workers behaving correctly give the same answer.
Following [22], we are now studying stronger models, in which workers collude in deciding when to cheat and when to
be honest. In a follow-up work we plan to investigate what happens if workers are connected to each other, forming a
network (i.e, a social network throughwhich they can communicate) or if malicious workers develop a more intelligent
strategy against the system. Also the degree of trust among the players has to be considered and modeled in this
scenario. Additionally, we have assumed throughout this work that workers are responsive and willing to perform the
task. In a follow up work, we plan to explore the case where workers might not be responsive. Another extension we
are planning to study is to assume a platform with multiple masters. The goal in this case is to match workers and
masters to maximize social efficiency, constrained to masters’ and workers’ preferences. Finally, we plan to extend
our mechanism to deal also with tasks where more than one responses might be considered correct.
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Figure 12: Presence of 5 malicious workers on the 500th round. Audit probability as a function of time and correct
reply percentage as a function of time. Parameters in all panels, initial pC = 1, initial pA = 0.5, WCT = 0.1,
WPC = 0 and α = 0.1, ai = 0.1, τ = 0.5. (a) Reputation Linear, (b) reputation Exponential and (c) reputation
Legacy Boinc, (d) reputation Boinc.
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